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By Michael Perino
aturday, March 4, 1933-Inauguration Day-was one of
those raw March days when it seems that spring will never
come. The thick layer of steel gray clouds sheathing the sky
threatened rain, and a northwest wind whipped across Capitol Hill.
Sunshine broke through on occasion, but it was dull and fleeting
and did little to relieve the dreariness of that damp, chilly day.
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Historians would later pinpoint
that winter as the nadir of the Great
Depression, but Americans hardly need-
ed to be seers to realize that the economy
could not get much worse. Thirty-eight
states had closed all their banks, and
everywhere else withdrawals were
sharply curtailed. Outright bank failures
numbered in the thousands annually.
In those days before deposit insurance,
one in four families lost their life sav-
ings. The economy was in full retreat,
industrial production was half what
it had been just four years earlier, and
unemployment was an appalling 25%.
Farm incomes were decimated after
a decade of plummeting crop prices.
Shantytowns of the dispossessed, sar-
castically dubbed Hoovervilles, dotted
the landscape, and breadlines stretched
around many blocks. Homes were fore-
closed, renters evicted, and signs of mal-
nutrition among schoolchildren were
increasingly evident. On Friday, March
3, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was
86% off its wildly inflated pre-crash
peak in September 1929. At the end of
trading that day, the New York Stock
Exchange announced that it would be
closed indefinitely.
In the midst of the economic chaos,
a shivering crowd of at least 100,000
gathered near the east portico of the
Capitol to hear Franklin Roosevelt's
plan of attack, some perched in the icy,
bare trees, others crammed in bleach-
ers or crowded atop adjacent buildings.
Pundits from all points of the politi-
cal spectrum were openly calling for
Roosevelt to assume dictatorial powers
to address the crisis. In some parts of
the country the possibility of revolution
was openly discussed, and Lloyds of
London was doing a booming business
in riot and civil disturbance insurance.
The previous spring, tens of thou-
sands of unemployed World War I vet-
erans and their families had marched on
Washington, demanding early payment
of a promised bonus for wartime ser-
vice, many protesting on the very spot
where the inaugural crowd now gath-
ered. The bonus never came, and in late
July, the Army chief of staff, General
Douglas MacArthur, let loose his cav-
alry, sabers and bayonets drawn, on the
thousands still milling in the capital.
Through clouds of tear gas, the tanks
and soldiers drove the bonus army from
the city and burned their encampment
along the Anacostia River to the ground.
Seven months later, Washington still had
an ominous, wartime feel. Government
buildings were heavily guarded, police
patrols ringed the White House, and
machine gun nests were strategically
placed along the inaugural parade route.
The new president made his way
across the crowded platform, gripping
his son Jimmy's arm with one hand and
leaning on a cane with the other, giv-
ing the crowd the illusion that he was
walking. After being sworn in by Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Roosevelt
turned to address the gathered crowd.
Despite the chill March air, he shed his
hat and overcoat. Grim-faced, his usual
broad smile absent on this solemn occa-
sion, he told the assembled crowd and
radio listeners that the only thing they
had to fear was fear itself-"nameless,
unreasoning, unjustified terror which
paralyzes needed efforts to convert
retreat into advance." Roosevelt's
address is rightly remembered for that
hopeful phrase and for his call for the
government to launch a war on the Great
Depression. Positioning himself in stark
contrast with Herbert Hoover, who sat
stonily just a few feet away, Roosevelt
pledged "action, and action now."
The Inaugural Address, however, did
more than just announce a vision for
fixing the economy; Roosevelt used it to
assign blame. Along with most everyone
else at the time, Roosevelt pointed his
finger at Wall Street, but his goal was not
demagoguery. He wasn't trying to accrete
power, but to stoke reform. The largely
silent crowd stirred when Roosevelt told
them that the "rulers of the exchange of
mankind's goods have failed, through
their own stubbornness and their own
incompetence, have admitted their
failure, and abdicated. Practices of the
unscrupulous money changers stand
indicted in the court of public opinion,
rejected by the hearts and minds of
men." Applause erupted for the first
time when Roosevelt proclaimed that
the "money changers have fled from
their high seats in the temple of our
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civilization. We may now restore that
temple to the ancient truths."
Somewhere in Manhattan, perhaps
sitting by the radio in his Upper West
Side apartment, Ferdinand Pecora must
have been smiling. It was Pecora, more
than anyone else, who deserved credit for
those lines. Though Roosevelt claimed
that the lines had come to him a week
earlier while he was sitting in a service
at St. James Episcopal Church, it was
Pecora-the man reporters called the
Hellhound of Wall Street-and the Senate
hearings he'd wrapped up just two days
earlier that had made those lines true.
Few Americans today know who
Ferdinand Pecora was, although he was
once a media superstar, a nearly daily
fixture in newspapers and radio broad-
casts across the country. With the onset
of our current economic woes his name
has slowly begun to crop up again. In
April 2009, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
called for a new "Pecora Commission"
to investigate "what happened on Wall
Street." The next week, the Senate
invoked Pecora's name in voting to create
an independent committee to investigate
the financial crisis, and in January 2010
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
held its first hearings.
economic impact, and long-lasting legis-
lative accomplishments, Pecora's inves-
tigation must rank as the most successful
inquiry in the more than 200-year history
of congressional probes.
Those hearings are largely forgotten
now. Those few who have heard of them
frequently get the basic facts wrong. And,
of course, even at the time not everyone
applauded Pecora's efforts. Raymond
Moley, a key member of Roosevelt's
Brain Trust, said that "Pecora was like
a police chief who rounds up all the
suspicious characters in town to solve a
jewel robbery." Pecora was accused of
grandstanding, with one writer calling
him "three-quarters righteous tribune of
the people [and] one-quarter demagogic
inquisitor." Critics charged that his reck-
less unveiling of Wall Street's sins only
exacerbated the banking crisis gripping
the country.
Pecora was ambitious, and he certainly
loved the limelight, but he was no more
a demagogue than Roosevelt. He was
avowedly liberal and reform minded;
to those who knew him best he was an
idealist with "an inveterate passion for
justice." No Wall Street expert, his con-
clusions about the impropriety of certain
stock market practices were sometimes
It's almost impossible not to hear in today's financial problems
the echoes of those hearings held more than 75 years ago.
Pecora, a diminutive Sicilian immi-
grant and a former assistant district
attorney from New York City, was chief
counsel for the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, charged with
investigating the causes of the 1929
stock market crash. As he recounted in
his own memoir of the hearings, Wall
Street under Oath: "Before [the commit-
tee] came, in imposing succession, the
demigods of Wall Street, men whose
names were household words, but whose
personalities and affairs were frequently
shrouded in deep, aristocratic mystery....
Never before in the history of the United
States had so much wealth and power
been required to render a public account-
ing." In terms of rapt public attention,
off base. In the end, though, those mis-
steps didn't matter. His success lay not
in his talent for inciting passions and
inflaming prejudices nor in the intellectu-
al purity of his arguments, but in his abil-
ity to crystallize the zeitgeist of the early
Depression years-the politicians' vague
and vitriolic denunciations of Wall Street
and the bitter grousing of a broken-down
populace-into hard facts and concrete
evidence.
Ultimately, the acclaim Pecora gar-
nered was justified because the hear-
ings he led fundamentally changed
the relationship between Washington
and Wall Street. Before 1933 the fed-
eral government had taken a hands-off
approach to the stock market. But the
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hearings, and the public clamor they cre-
ated, changed all that. In his inaugural
address, Roosevelt declared, "There must
be an end to a conduct in banking and
in business which too often has given
to a sacred trust the likeness of callous
and selfish wrongdoing," and he called
for "strict supervision of all banking and
credits and investments." Many would
argue that the former is still all too true,
but Roosevelt at least delivered on the
latter. Over the course of Roosevelt's
famous first 100 days in office and then
in the year following, Congress passed
and Roosevelt signed a flurry of banking
and securities legislation, most of which
still governs our financial markets today.
The first federal securities laws, federal
deposit insurance, and the creation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission all
trace their roots back to that fertile politi-
cal soil.
Pecora made it all possible because
his investigation created the sensational
headlines necessary to galvanize public
opinion for reform. As Benjamin Cohen, a
lawyer and one of the primary drafters of
those laws, put it, bankers were "so dis-
credited in the public eye that Congress
was ready to pass anything." Securities
and Exchange Commission historian Joel
Seligman argues that "effective securities
legislation might not have been enacted
had Pecora's revelations not galvanized
broad public support for direct fed-
eral regulation of stock markets." Even
Roosevelt drew a direct link between the
wrongdoing Pecora uncovered and his
ability to push through reform legislation.
The legislative changes flowed right out
of the hearings. "We built completely on
his work," James M. Landis, former com-
mission chairman and another drafter
of the securities laws, observed. Most
famous congressional hearings take the
name of the committee chair, but Pecora's
stellar performance was so dominating,
his questioning so riveting, and his inves-
tigations so thorough that the Banking
and Currency hearings eventually became
known simply as the Pecora hearings.
In short, the hearings played a critical
role in our financial history. And they
almost didn't happen.
Almost, that is, but for Pecora's pro-
digious legal skills mixed with a healthy
dose of luck and what can only be
described as impeccable timing. In fact,
most of the Pecora hearings would never
have occurred without a single, decisive
turning point, a key moment that made
the rest of the hearings and reform legis-
lation possible. Before Pecora's appoint-
ment as chief counsel, the hearings had
dragged on for nearly a year. Despite a
great deal of early effort and promise,
they had made little discernible head-
way and the resolution authorizing the
investigation was about to expire. Nearly
everyone believed the probe would limp
quietly offstage, accomplishing nothing
and leaving Wall Street untouched. The
turning point-and the primary inspira-
tion for Roosevelt's line about the money
changers fleeing the temple-came in late
February 1933, just a few short weeks
after Pecora was first appointed coun-
sel. It was just 10 days, the 10 days in
which Pecora examined the officers from
National City Bank (now, a few name
changes later, Citigroup), particularly its
chairman, Charles E. Mitchell. Pecora too
recognized the key role this brief period
played, writing that in those few days
"a whole era of American financial life
passed away."
Although he too has faded from mem-
ory, Mitchell was one of the best-known
bankers of his day. Edmund Wilson, writ-
ing for the New Republic in 1933, said
that "Sunshine" Charlie was "the banker
of bankers, the salesman of salesmen, the
genius of the Nevi Economic Era." The
son of a produce dealer and the one-time
mayor of gritty Chelsea, Massachusetts,
Mitchell started off as a $10-a-week clerk
for Western Electric, moved to Wall
Street, and made a fortune by funda-
mentally changing how it operated. He
almost single-handedly pioneered the
sale of stocks and bonds to middle-class
investors. At the height of the bubble, he
proclaimed that the market had nowhere
to go but up, and he was constantly on
top of his salesmen, hectoring, berating,
bullying, and cajoling them to sell more
and more of the securities City Bank
"manufactured."
At first glance, the confrontation
between Pecora and Mitchell hardly
seemed like a fair fight, though the two
men were not completely dissimilar. Both
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were smart, hardworking, and shared a
burning ambition-Mitchell for wealth
and Pecora for acclaim. But that's where
the similarities ended. Mitchell had testi-
fied in congressional hearings before and
had emerged unscathed. Pecora had been
committee counsel for just a few weeks
and had almost no time to investigate the
bank's complex and far-flung operations.
than 75 years ago. Most Americans then
blamed Wall Street and the banking sec-
tor for the ills facing the country. There
was populist outrage over excessive exec-
utive compensation. The markets seemed
to be awash in manipulative short selling,
in favorable deals for the fortunate few,
and in dodgy loans that were foisted on
unwary investors. Against the backdrop
The relationship between Wall Street and Washington
was forever altered.
Mitchell was a world-renowned banker
and an adviser to Presidents Harding,
Coolidge, and Hoover on economic mat-
ters. Outside New York, almost no one
had ever heard of Ferdinand Pecora.
Mitchell was a member of New York's
social elite, with all the trappings of
Wall Street success-a Fifth Avenue
mansion, houses in Tuxedo Park and the
Hamptons, country club memberships,
and a garage full of big, fast cars. Pecora
was an Italian immigrant who was still
struggling to overcome the bigotry and
stereotypes of the day. After years of gov-
ernment service, he had managed to save
just a few hundred dollars. Mitchell had
the wealth and resources of City Bank at
his disposal, and he strode into the hear-
ing room surrounded by the most expen-
sive legal talent in the country. Pecora
had just cobbled together a tiny staff of
first-generation immigrants, all earning
the same meager salary he did. Nobody
was expecting very much from Pecora.
Just 10 days after the City Bank hear-
ings began, Mitchell would walk out
alone, discredited and disgraced. The
bank quickly accepted his resignation.
Pecora had shown that the bank and its
securities-trading arm had engaged in all
sorts of unsavory behavior. It sold worth-
less bonds to investors without fully dis-
closing their risks, manipulated its own
stock price and the stock prices of other
companies, and lavishly compensated
its executives as the country plunged
into depression. It's almost impossible
not to hear in today's financial problems
the echoes of those hearings held more
of the then-exploding banking crisis, the
disclosures were riveting and, ultimately,
revolutionary.
While the investigation continued
to produce stunning revelations for
months-including a dramatic confronta-
tion between Pecora and J.P. Morgan Jr.
later that spring-it was those 10 days
that set the tone for everything that fol-
lowed. It was then, when banks across
the country were shuttering, when City
Bank's executives were in the dock, and
when Pecora led America through the
bank's financial machinations, that the
federal government crossed its regula-
tory Rubicon. This was the turning
point in which the relationship between
Wall Street and Washington was forever
altered.
Even more than that, it seemed to
be a visible turning point in American
society. In an ornate hearing room in
Washington, one of the new Americans,
so long dispossessed and marginalized,
was firmly in control of the machinery of
federal government. An Italian American,
a member of a group almost universally
regarded as crime-prone and lawless, was
exposing the lawlessness of the Anglo-
Saxons who ruled Wall Street. Those 10
days were a vivid sign that something
fundamental had changed in the power
structure of the country. m
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